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Abstract: 
There are two polar views on the issue of discounting.  One is to focus on intergenera-
tional equity which means discounting utilities at low rates.  Alternatively, the focus is 
on efficiency where the choice of the discount rate should imply rates of return that are 
similar to those that prevail in the capital markets.  This paper analyses how different 
discount rates affect greenhouse gas abatement and endogenous technological 
change.  Starting point is a simple analytical model where we show that higher dis-
count rates cannot result in smaller stocks of atmospheric carbon.  However, we can-
not rule out the paradoxical result that a higher discount rate may lead to a higher 
knowledge stock.  Therefore an Integrated Assessment Model is set up to take a 
closer look into the time pattern of emissions.  Surprisingly, low discount rates lead to 
a sharp increase in emissions during the beginning of the time horizon, which, how-
ever, is overcompensated through higher efforts in greenhouse gas mitigation during 
the rest of the time horizon.  Furthermore, at low discount rates, the potential to save 
energy through technological innovation is utilized faster and more pronounced than 
with higher discount rates.  
 
JEL Classification: Q40, O13. 
Key-Words : Integrated Assessment, discount rate, endogenous technologi-
cal change, climate change. 
 
1 Introduction 
Two aspects are of central importance for the future of the global climate and - to a 
certain extent - for the future of the human society.  These are the timing of green-
house gas emissions on the one hand, and the de-carbonization of the economy on 
the other.  The reason is quite obvious.  Because of the tremendous inertia of the 
climate system, the earlier greenhouse gas emissions are abated, and the earlier 
less carbon intense or even carbon free technologies are innovated, the lower is the 
climatic impact of human activities, and hence the lower are the economics costs, 
future generations have to carry in responding to the challenge of global warming. 
Welfare economics is based on the seemingly insipid presumption that preferences 
should count (see Pearce et al. (2003)).  Since current emissions are small compared 
to the existing stock of atmospheric carbon, abatement costs are borne early, but 
benefits do not accrue until the distant future.  Consequently, climate policy affects 
the welfare of the present and of the future generations, and discounting is a logical 
consequence from the basic value judgment of prescriptive economics. 
However, discounting is not only a technical necessity.  It also has an ethical dimen-
sion, for the higher is the discount rate, the lower is the weight placed on the welfare 
of future generations.  Some find it ethically indefensible to treat generations differ-
ently, simply because they are born at different time.  But not to discount implies dis-
counting at rate zero and would lead - as is well known since Koopmans’ pioneering 
work (see Koopmans (1965)) - to extensively high savings by the present generation.  
This is also difficult to defend, or as Arrow (1999, 16) writes:  “… that all generations 
(should) be treated alike, itself reasonable, contradicts a very strong intuition that it is 
not morally acceptable to demand excessively high saving rates of any genera-
tion…”. 
In the past a lot has been published on the issue of evaluating costs and benefits of 
greenhouse gas mitigation, on the conflict between intergenerational equity and in-
tertemporal efficiency, on the issue of discounting for the short-run versus for the 
long-term, as well as on the related problem of how best to discount the future in the 
case of uncertainty.  For an overview, see Portney and Weyant (1999).  This paper 
analyses an issue that is a bit aside of the main stream.  Neglecting uncertainty it 
discusses the implications discounting utilities has when technological change is en-
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dogenous.  More precisely, it analyses the question:  How does the choice of a dis-
count rate affect greenhouse gas abatement and the innovation of technologies? 
Why is this an important issue to be considered?  In principle there are two policy 
options for responding to the challenge of global warming.  One is called a cap and 
trade policy, and the other is known as intensity targeting.  The first one is in the spirit 
of the Kyoto Protocol and focuses on reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  The sec-
ond one corresponds to the policy the US has announced and argues for combating 
with the global warming through technical innovation.   
Both, greenhouse gas mitigation and technological innovation can be viewed as in-
vestment into the future.  Consequently, the choice of the discount rate affects both 
options.  For example, Stephan and Müller-Fürstenberger (1998) have shown that 
there is an inverse relationship between the discount rate on the one hand and 
greenhouse gas abatement on the other.  A rapid step up in near term abatement - 
even above efficiency levels – is observed, if a society places almost identical weight 
on the welfare of any generation. 
Moreover, the choice of the discount rate affects the interaction between greenhouse 
gas abatement and technological innovation.  For example, Goulder and Mathai 
(2000) observed a delay in greenhouse gas mitigation, if improvements in abatement 
technologies are expected.  For, if abatement costs will be reduced by technological 
change, then it is profitable to abate more, but deferred into the future.  Conse-
quently, one might suppose that the way, discounting effects greenhouse gas 
abatement, is at least partly counterbalanced through technological innovation. 
Summing up, this paper focuses on two questions:  (1) How does the choice of the 
discount rate affect both greenhouse gas abatement and technological change?  (2) 
How does the interaction between mitigation and innovation depend on the choice of 
the discount rate?  Before proceeding to a numerical analysis at hand of an inte-
grated assessment model (see Chapter 3), let us first clarify ideas in a simple model.   
 
2 Some simple analytics 
Global climate change is viewed as public bad and negatively affects conventional 
wealth.  In each period t = 0,…,T, the world’s gross production net of climate dam-
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ages can be consumed or might be invested into a stock1 of energy-related techno-
logical knowledge.  This is nothing else than to say that future is influenced through 
investing into knowledge capital and / or by investing into environmental capital 
through greenhouse gas mitigation. 
To keep considerations as simple as possible, let carbon energy be the only input 
into production, and let production be characterized by a concave function f(a(Zt)et).  
et represents the energy input which is measured in carbon equivalents to energy 
consumption, and thus directly governs the greenhouse gas emissions.  Zt denotes 
the stock of technological knowledge and determines the energy efficiency a(Zt) of 
gross production (GDP).  Note that with this formulation innovating new technologies 
can either increase the energy efficiency of production or reduce the carbon intensity 
of production. 
Let the impact of global climate change be measured in terms of GDP losses only.  
These impacts are termed market damages in contrast to so-called non-market dam-
ages such as species losses, which are directly expressed in terms of welfare losses 
(see Manne and Stephan (2005)).  Consequently, social welfare purely depends on 
the discounted sum of instantaneous utility U of consumption ct.  Let δ denote the dis-
count factor, then any optimal allocation is a solution of 
 
∑
=
−T
0t
t
t )c(UδMax  
subject to 
 
(2.1)  , 1ttt QQγe +=+
(2.2)  0c)ZεZ()e)Z(a(f)Q(θ tt1tttt ≥−−− + . 
 
Equation (2.1) describes the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions such 
as carbon dioxide (CO2) and global climate change in the most simple way:  The fu-
                                                 
1 Here, technological change is driven by piling up a knowledge stock and innovation is viewed as a 
function of expenditure in research and development (see Nordhaus (2002)).  However, this is not 
the only way to make technological progress endogenous.  Alternatively, technological change might 
result from learning by doing (see Gerlach et al (2004)). 
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ture stock Qt+1 of atmospheric greenhouse gases depends on the present concentration 
Qt as well as global emissions which directly corresponds to energy inputs et, while γ 
denotes the factor by which natural abatement processes reduce existing stocks of at-
mospheric greenhouse gases. 
Equation (2.2) describes the material balance of produced goods.  θ is the economic 
survival factor and measures the fraction of conventional gross output that is at the 
society’s disposal.  That means, the more carbon energy is consumed over the time 
horizon considered, the higher is the stock Qt of accumulated global emissions, and 
hence, the lower will be the fraction θ(Qt)f(a(Zt)et) of conventional wealth that is avail-
able in period t.2  This remaining fraction is called green GDP.  Therefore equation 
(2.2) indicates, how green GDP is allocated between consumption ct and investment 
(Zt+1 - εZt) into the knowledge stock, where it is taken into account that without activity 
knowledge will erode at rate 1 - ε.  
Now suppose that there are increasing damages from carbon energy consumption, 
i.e., θ’ < 0, θ’’ < 0 and that production is characterized by decreasing returns of scale 
both in energy and knowledge, i.e., f’ > 0, f’’ < 0 and a’ > 0, a’’ < 0, respectively.  Fur-
thermore, let us assume that production is linear homogenous in energy and let us 
focus on interior solutions only.  Then first order conditions imply the following Ram-
sey type conditions for optimality 
 
(2.3)  
)c('U
)c('U)e(f)Z('a)Q(
t
1t
ttt
−=+ δεθ , 
(2.4)  
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Putting together  
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2  Alternatively, 1 - θ measures the economic costs of global climate change in terms of foregone GDP.  
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allows for a nice interpretation.  Since there are two option for investing into the fu-
ture, either by investing into the knowledge stock Zt, or by investing into climate qual-
ity through greenhouse gas mitigation, the above equation says that the opportunity 
costs of investing into knowledge through reducing abatement in period t-1 has to be 
equal of opportunity costs of extending abatement in period t. 
What else can be concluded from our considerations so far?  To achieve more in-
sight, let us focus on what is called a stationary modified golden rule (see Burmeister 
and Turnovsky (1972)) by supposing that both stocks and flows stay constant over 
time, i.e., ct = c, et = e, Qt = Q, and Zt = Z for all t.  Then from equations (2.3) and 
(2.4) immediately follows 
 
(2.3a)   δεθ =+)e(f)Z('a)Q(
(2.4a)  δγ
)e('f)Z(a)Q(θ
)e(f)Z(a)Q('θ
=+
+− . 
 
Now, let δ* > δ in the following, and let Q, Z, e, as well as Q*, Z*, e* denote the corre-
sponding steady state values.  Then from condition (2.4a) we can conclude that it is 
impossible that a higher discount rate can be associated with a lower stock of atmos-
pheric carbon.  To see this note that condition (2.4a) yields 
 
(2.5)  
*)e('f*)Q(θ  
*)e(f*)Q('θ
)e('f)Q(θ   
)e(f)Q('θ −
<
− . 
 
Since Q > Q*, we have θ(Q*) > θ(Q) as well as e > e*, hence f’(e*) > f’(e).  Therefore 
the denominator of the left hand side of inequality (2.5) is smaller than the one on the 
right hand side, hence 
 
*)e(f*)Q('θ)e(f)Q('θ −<− . 
 
Because of the assumptions made on θ this is in contradiction to Q > Q*. 
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With a one-sector growth model a decrease of the discount rate always implies an 
increase of the optimal steady state capital stock.  In the literature this phenomenon 
is called capital deepening (see Burmeister and Turnovsky (1972)).  However, in 
models with heterogeneous capital such a response cannot be expected in general.  
For example, Burmeister and Dobell (1970) have shown that even in a well-behaved 
Cobb-Douglas world there is no unambiguous capital deepening.  The possibility of 
substitution between different capital goods prohibits any hope that the stocks of dif-
ferent capital goods will – in any case - move into the same direction. 
What does this mean for this analysis?  We have shown that a higher discount rate 
cannot result in a smaller stock of atmospheric carbon, or to put it alternatively into a 
higher stock of environmental capital. Nonetheless, since environmental quality and 
knowledge are viewed as different capital goods, we cannot exclude that our models 
might exhibit a paradoxical behavior in the sense that a higher discount rate implies a 
higher knowledge stock.  For if Q* ≥ Q, then e* > e, and from equation (2.3a) follows 
 
  *)e(f*)Z('a*)e(f*)Z('a
)Q(θ
*)Q(θ)e(f)Z('a ≤< ,  
 
which is feasible even if Z* > Z. 
Steady state analysis typically reflects what happens over the very long run, but it 
bears no information about the traverse between different steady states or about ad-
justment to changes in the boundary conditions such as the discount rate.  For get-
ting more insight we will therefore concentrate in the following on a numerical analy-
sis through employing a CGE based integrated assessment model.  
 
3 Integrated assessment analysis 
The following analysis is based on a top-down intertemporal general equilibrium 
model of integrated assessment. For details see Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan 
(2006). For the present purposes it is reduced in complexity to be sufficiently trans-
parent as to allow the implications of alternative viewpoints to be explored.  It inte-
grates sub models that provide a reduced-form description of technological innova-
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tion, the economy, emissions, concentrations, temperature change, and damage as-
sessment.   
 
3.1 Key features of the integrated assessment framework 
As above, technological change will improve the energy efficiency, and hence, can 
allow for a higher gross output at lower energy inputs.  Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the 
only greenhouse gas, and the demands for carbon emissions are generated indi-
rectly through a nested production function.  That means, in each period t there are 
two input aggregates into gross production yt.  On the one hand these is carbon en-
ergy et, and there is value added vt on the other: 
 
(3.1)  . [ ] ρ/1ρttρtt )ea(vy +=
 
There is Cobb-Douglas substitution between capital and labor, which together pro-
duce value added.  And there is a less than unitary, but constant elasticity of substitu-
tion ρ  between the capital-labor aggregate vt and energy.  Here we do not discern 
between conventional fossils similar to the types that are currently available and car-
bon-free energy that may be introduced in the future.  Instead et is the aggregated 
input of different forms of carbon as well as alternative energy and is measured in 
carbon units. 
Output productivity of energy is represented by at which depends - as will be dis-
cussed below - on technological innovation.  Thus, greenhouse gas abatement can 
result from reducing the amount of energy per unit of output, which may be achieved 
in two ways:  either by substituting energy through labor and capital, and / or by in-
creasing the energy efficiency of production.  In both of these cases, abatement re-
quires an economic investment. 
Technological change is implemented by combining a capital vintage and Research 
and Development (R&D) approach. First, in each period there exists a stock Zt of 
technological knowledge, which can be enlarged through investment mt
 
 8
(3.2)  . 5.0tt1t mZεZ +=+
 
As equation (3.2) indicates, R&D investments are characterized by decreasing re-
turns, and technological knowledge devaluates at factor ε over time.  Note that de-
creasing returns reflect what is called a fishing-out effect and capacity constraints 
(limited pool of “brains”) in knowledge production (see Jones (1995)).  
Second, technological improvements can affect energy productivity at only, if new 
vintages of conventional capital are used in production.  In other words, energy sav-
ing technological change is embodied and can be brought into application only, if a 
new vintage of physical capital is invested. 
Now, let nt denote the fraction of new vintages of the total stock of physical capital 
that is available at the beginning of period t+1.  Since new vintages support increases 
in energy efficiency, energy efficiency evolves according to  
 
(3.3)   )nσ1(aa ttt1t +=+
 
The efficiency improvement rate σt is bounded between 0 and σΜ and depends upon 
Zt according to  
 
(3.4)  . MZt σ)e1(σ t
−−=
 
A "two-box" analysis is employed to cumulate carbon emissions over time, and to 
translate them into global concentrations.  The numerical model is calibrated so that if 
there is zero abatement, concentrations will rise from 353 ppmv (the 1990 level) to 
550 ppmv (twice the pre-industrial level) by about 2080.  This leads to damages of 
2.5% of gross output.  At other concentration levels, the damages are projected as 
though they were proportional to the square of the increase in concentrations over 
the 1990 level (for details see Joos et al. (1999)). 
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For simplicity, we neglect the thermal inertia lag between global concentrations and 
climate change.  We also neglect the cooling effects of aerosols and the heating ef-
fects of greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide.  Instead, potential global warm-
ing is directly attributed to increased atmospheric CO2 concentration and will be trans-
lated into its economic impact according to a quadratic damage function θt which 
measures the fraction of conventional wealth that is available for disposal as green 
GDP. 
Green GDP might be used for consumption, investment either into physical capital or 
technological knowledge and to cover energy costs.  Labor is expressed in efficiency 
units, and it is inelastic in supply.  Physical capital is accumulated just as in a conven-
tional Ramsey model, and it is subject to intertemporal depreciation.  Consequently, 
our calculations are based on the assumption that the world economy follows a Ram-
sey path, striking an optimal balance between consumption and investment into 
physical capital and knowledge.  Solutions are obtained via Rutherford’s sequential 
joint maximization method - a specialization of the Negishi approach (see Rutherford 
(1995)).  
 
3.2 Results 
As was mentioned in the introduction there are conflicting views on the issue of dis-
counting.  To test for the sensitivity of the results with respect to the utility discount 
rate, we take up these polar views and discern between two states of the word: (1) 
one in which intergenerational equity is an important issue, hence future utilities are 
discounted at low rates (1 % per year), and (2), one in which efficiency is the main 
focus, and hence the choice of the discount rate (3% per year) implies rates of return 
that are similar to those that actually prevail in international capital markets.  This is 
said to be a descriptive scenario whereas in the first case the society has taken a 
prescriptive perspective. 
Benchmark year is 2002, time steps are five years in length, and computations are 
carried out till the end of the century.  Figure 3.1 presents the evolution of the global 
atmospheric carbon concentration both under a descriptive (3%) and prescriptive 
(1%) use of the discount rate.  For judging these results it has to be kept in mind that 
our simulations are based upon two important assumptions.  First, we focus on 
pareto-efficiency in greenhouse gas abatement, i.e., there is full cooperation among 
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nations in global climate policy.  Second, knowledge is global public good from which 
everybody can profit without any costs.  
Putting together this explains why our simulations yield rather low atmospheric car-
bon concentrations.  And since the optimal atmospheric carbon concentration is quite 
low, the differences between the two scenarios are also small, simply because the 
damages associated with such concentrations are very small.  Nevertheless, it is ob-
vious that with a lower discount rate the optimal stock of atmospheric carbon is 
smaller than with a higher discount rate. 
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Figure 3.1: Atmospheric carbon concentration measured in parts per million 
volume (ppmv). The Benchmark level is 374 ppmv (2002-2003) 
 
So far the results of the simulation are consistent to what we expect:  The lower is the 
discount rate the more carbon dioxide emissions are abated, thus the more is invested 
into future environmental capital.  However, a closer look into the time pattern of emis-
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sions exhibits a somewhat surprising outcome.  As Figure 3.2 shows there is a signifi-
cant difference in the time profile of CO2 emissions under the states of the world.  
Compared to a descriptive approach with discounting utilities at a rate of 3%, a pre-
scriptive perspective (1 % discount rate) would lead to a sharp increase in emissions 
during the first fifteen years which is, however, overcompensated through higher ef-
forts in greenhouse gas mitigation during the rest of the time horizon.   
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Figure 3.2: Carbon dioxide emissions (in giga tons) 
 
In the literature this is called rebounding effect (see Geller and Attali (2005)).  An ex-
planation for that outcome is that in a prescriptive world the society puts a higher 
value on the welfare of future generations than in a descriptive one. Since future wel-
fare depends on future consumption, thus on green GDP, a prescriptive society in-
tends to invest as much as possible into the future capital stocks in order to grant 
high GDP and consumption potentials to the future generations. This in turn is possi-
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ble only, if there is a significant step up in gross production, which means despite of 
technological innovations an increase of carbon energy consumption. 
Within our integrated assessment framework, there are at least three options to 
check for that explanation.  These are the development of per capital GDP as well as 
per capita consumption on the one hand, and these are the investments in physical 
as well as knowledge capital on the other. 
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Figure 3.3: Green per capita GDP and per capita consumption 
 
Figure 3.3 contains two kinds of information.  First it displays, how global green per 
capital GDP changes over time, both for the 3 % as well as 1 % utility discounting 
scenario. Although differences seem quite small, the choice of the discount rate in-
versely correlates to economic growth, and leads roughly to a 30 % difference in 
green GDP in 2050.  
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Moreover, Figure 3.3 also shows that per capita consumption develops as we have 
anticipated.  At the beginning of the time horizon per capita consumption in a pre-
scriptive world is smaller than in the descriptive one, but grows faster. By the end of 
the time horizon in a prescriptive world per capita consumption is even higher than is 
a descriptive one. 
This is a clear-cut indicator for what we have explained above.  These differences in 
economic growth are due to the fact that the lower is the discount rate the more is 
invested into the future, either in terms of physical capital and /or technological 
knowledge and/or environmental capital. To see this, let us first consider the differ-
ences in the development of the stocks of physical capital. 
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Figure 3.4: Physical capital stock (per capita values) 
 
 Figure 3.4 shows how the world’s physical capital stock changes relative to the 
benchmark value (2002 world capital stock).  Again significant differences are ob-
served between a descriptive and prescriptive scenario, which become quite obvious 
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after 2030.  And the impact of the discount rate on physical capital investments is 
more pronounced than its impact on GDP.  This is not surprising as the marginal rate 
of return declines for growing capital stocks. 
Physical capital is only one of the three capital stocks we have modeled.  The second 
one is a knowledge stock with respect to the application of energy in consump-
tion/investment goods production.  This intangible capital stock is directly related to 
the factor productivity of energy in macro-production (for details, see Müller-
Fürstenberger and Stephan (2006)).  The knowledge stock is augmented and main-
tained in the same way as physical capital; it takes stream of R&D expenditure to 
build it up and to keep it at a given level.  
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Figure 3.5: Knowledge stock relative to benchmark 
 
Figures 3.5 exhibits the results for knowledge capital.  If utilities are discounted at 3 
%, the potential to increase efficiency of energy in macro production is rapidly in-
creased and kept constant after 2010.  By contrast, in the “prescriptive” scenario (1% 
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per year), the potential of R&D to save energy is utilized more pronounced and on a 
longer time-scale.  
 
4 Conclusions 
How does the choice of the discount rate affect greenhouse gas abatement as well 
as the formation of technological knowledge?  By means of a simple analytical 
model we have shown that a higher discount rate cannot lead to a lower stock of 
atmospheric carbon.  Here the so-called capital deepening phenomenon applies, but 
we cannot rule out that the knowledge stocks increase despite of an increase of the 
discount rate. 
Although these results hold under quite mild assumptions, they apply only for the 
steady-state solution.  Steady states give relevant information about the far distant 
future, which is of course of relevance in case of the global climate problem.  How-
ever, to get some idea about the transitory behavior of the global economy – a 
phase, which is likely to take more than hundred years - we have extended our ana-
lytical considerations to an Integrated Assessment Analysis.  The numerical simula-
tion exhibited quite surprising patterns in the transitory phase.  First, atmospheric 
carbon slightly goes up, when the discount rate is reduced from three to one per-
cent.  This is in contrast to our theoretical capital deepening result for the steady 
state.  In the transitory phase the economy obviously experiences some type of re-
bounding effect.  Second, knowledge accumulation is highly sensitive on the dis-
count rate.  The potential to improve the emission to GDP ratio is exploited very fast 
in the case of low discount rates.  
What is the relevance of these findings and what are needs for future research?  
First note that there are different view on post-Kyoto policy options:  One could be 
some kind of Kyoto-for-ever which means to set incentives for a pareto-efficient in-
ternationalisation of the external effects of global climate change through trading 
carbon emission rights on open global markets.  Alternatively, one could vision pro-
viding greenhouse gas insurance through technological innovation - even without the 
need of international coordination and cooperation in greenhouse gas mitigation.  
Such a policy is advocated by the US administration and would require a fast exploi-
tation of knowledge pools.  Our analysis shows, that greenhouse gas intensity tar-
geting might be in line with a cost-benefit analysis at low discount rates.  However, 
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for a more profound analysis future research should extend our framework in two 
directions.  First, it should allow for non-cooperative behavior in the solution of the 
global climate problem.  And second, it should take into account, which technological 
knowledge may result from learning-by-doing.  
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